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Borrowing 180 million on one hand while paying out 199 million in dividends on the other.

The internet-famous massage device brand SKG, endorsed by Wang Yibo, is heading for an IPO again.

This marks the fourth attempt by its parent company, Future Wearable Health Technology Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as "Future Wearable"), to enter the capital market within four years.

In June 2022, Future Wearable's ChiNext IPO application was accepted, and it was voluntarily withdrawn in July 2023; in August 2024, it was listed on the New Third Board and launched counseling for the Beijing Stock Exchange, which was terminated in August 2025, and it was delisted from the New Third Board in November of the same year; in December 2025, it submitted its first application to the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, which subsequently lapsed; on August 19, 2026, the company once again submitted its prospectus to the Main Board of the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, with CITIC Securities International as the sole sponsor.

Across these four attempts, comparing the prospectuses and financial statements from each time, two issues deserve high attention from investors: the controlling shareholder's "cash machine"-style dividends; and on the company's sales side, the unresolved mystery surrounding its distributors.

Who Are the Anonymous Major Clients?

From 2019 to 2022, Future Wearable's operating revenue was 792 million yuan, 991 million yuan, 1.06 billion yuan, and 905 million yuan, respectively; net profit attributable to parent was 213 million yuan, 143 million yuan, 132 million yuan, and 119 million yuan, with year-on-year changes of -32.71%, -8.26%, and -9.28%, showing a trend of increasing revenue without increasing profit year by year. The Hong Kong prospectus shows that from 2023 to 2025, the company's revenue was 1.046 billion yuan, 1.045 billion yuan, and 1.218 billion yuan, respectively, with net profit of 127 million yuan, 136 million yuan, and 132 million yuan; in the first five months of 2026, revenue was 646 million yuan and net profit was 62 million yuan. The proportion of distribution revenue fell from 90.8% in 2023 to 78.4% in the first five months of 2026, while the direct sales proportion rose from 8.1% to 20.4%. One issue that needs attention is that the rise in the direct sales proportion may have formed a "contradiction" with SKG's earlier sales strategy; and this "contradiction" becomes even more shrouded in fog when its top five customers are handled "anonymously." The Hong Kong prospectus shows that all of the top five customers are distributors, with combined revenue contribution dropping from 52.0% in 2023 to 35.7% in the first five months of 2026. However, the prospectus only lists them under codes such as "Customer A/B/C" without disclosing specific names. As a company where online sales are absolutely dominant, comparing with earlier ChiNext disclosures, the identities of these major distributors may still be partially discernible. Public information shows that the above distributors are in fact mostly the operating entities of SKG's "official flagship stores" on e-commerce platforms such as Tmall and JD.com. For example, on the JD platform, the operating entity of "SKG JD Flagship Store" and "SKG Flagship Store" is Beijing Shengde Jiarun Intelligent Technology Co., Ltd.; the operating entity of "SKG Massager Flagship Store" is Anhui Borui Sheng'an Technology Co., Ltd., which is an entity under the same control as major client Beijing Kaide Yisheng Technology Co., Ltd.; on the Tmall platform, major client Shanghai Guyin Network Technology Co., Ltd. is the operating entity of "SKG Flagship Store," and Qingdao Xinhe Run E-commerce Co., Ltd., under the same control as major client Qingdao Zuma Trading Co., Ltd., is the operating entity of "SKG Sports Flagship Store"; given that online sales are dominant, the above ChiNext major clients are very likely still "major clients." But why make them anonymous in the Hong Kong prospectus? One aside is that in the earlier ChiNext disclosure, a 2022 investigative report by the Mingjing Finance Studio of the Mass Securities News stated that Shanghai Guyin Network Technology Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as "Shanghai Guyin"), which ranked as the largest customer for two consecutive years in 2019 and 2020, may have had a close relationship with Liu Jie, the actual controller of Future Wearable. The report stated that Lin Guoxun, the legal representative before 2019 of Shanghai Guyin's outbound investment enterprise "Foshan Shunde District Aishikaiqi Import and Export Co., Ltd.," was precisely the mother of Liu Jie, the actual controller of Future Wearable. In 2019 and 2020, the transaction amounts between Shanghai Guyin and Future Wearable reached as high as 107 million yuan and 187 million yuan, respectively; in 2021, the transaction amount with Shanghai Guyin and entities under the same control was 102 million yuan, ranking as the third-largest customer. Only after the first round of inquiries from the Shenzhen Stock Exchange did Future Wearable supplementally disclose the reasons for transferring its subsidiary to a major customer, the equity transaction price, and its relationship with Future Wearable after the transfer. The hidden relationship exposed by the above report was, in fact, also generated by the subsidiary transfer. This supplementary disclosure also revealed that a number of core and important SKG e-commerce stores on the market were actually transferred by Future Wearable to distributors between 2018 and 2019, and the transfer prices were mostly 0 yuan or 1 yuan. At the time, the reason given for the transfers was to let distributors specialize in their own fields while the company concentrated resources on brand building and product research and development. Against this backdrop, the anonymous handling of major clients in the Hong Kong filing, as well as the trend of "rising direct sales," makes the business strategy appear quite contradictory. If the company really wanted to focus on brand building and product research and development, why has the direct sales proportion started to rise again? Are the online direct sales operating stores newly built, or have the stores originally transferred to distributors been taken back?

The Controlling Shareholder's "Cash Machine"-Style Dividends

Looking back at history, Future Wearable paid out nearly 600 million yuan in cumulative dividends over six years, with the actual controller taking 536 million yuan. In 2025, the company declared dividends of 199 million yuan to equity shareholders and completed payment in two installments in September and October 2025, while net profit for the same period was only 132 million yuan. Based on net profit of 106 million yuan for the first nine months of 2025, the dividend payout ratio was as high as 187.74%. Liu Jie and Xu Siying, through direct shareholding and platforms such as Future Life Investment and Little Goose Ballet, collectively controlled 85.94% of the company's voting rights. Based on this calculation, about 171 million yuan of the 199 million yuan dividend flowed into the pockets of the controlling couple. At the same time, the company's interest-bearing bank borrowings surged from 173,000 yuan at the end of 2022 to 180 million yuan by the end of 2025. "Borrowing with the left hand while paying dividends with the right hand" shifts financial risk onto public investors after listing just before the IPO. During the ChiNext period, dividends in 2020, 2021, and 2022 were 155 million yuan, 160 million yuan, and 50 million yuan, respectively, totaling 365 million yuan. Net profit attributable to parent in the same period was 140 million yuan, 130 million yuan, and 120 million yuan, respectively, with dividend amounts in both 2020 and 2021 exceeding that year's net profit. At that time, Liu Jie and his wife collectively held 93.07% of the shares and received about 340 million yuan in cumulative dividends over three years. Before the Hong Kong filing, dividends in 2023 were 30 million yuan, with Liu Jie and Xu Siying receiving about 25.782 million yuan. Cumulatively, from 2020 to 2025, the company paid about 594 million yuan in dividends, and the controlling couple Liu Jie and his wife received about 536 million yuan in cumulative dividends over six years. As of May 2026, the company's book cash and cash equivalents were only about 9.82 million yuan. For a company planning to list, having less than 10 million yuan in book cash as of May 2026 and relying heavily on external borrowing for operations, with interest-bearing bank borrowings having surged to 180 million yuan, a considerable portion of the IPO proceeds will be used for "replenishing capital" rather than business development. Distributing large amounts of profit to the actual controller while raising funds from public investors through an IPO to "replenish capital"—is such a company still pushing for listing in order to make the enterprise bigger and stronger?